It had the most significant oil fields in Europe, and Germany eagerly bought its petroleum, as well as food exports.įrom the point of view of its belligerent status, Romania was a neutral country between 28 July 1914 and 27 August 1916, a belligerent country on the part of the Entente from 27 August 1916 to 9 December 1917, in a state of armistice with the Central Powers from 10 December 1917 to, a non-combatant country between and 10 November 1918, and finally a belligerent country in the Entente between 10 and 11 November 1918.Īt the start of World War I, King Carol I of Romania favored Germany, while the nation's political elite favored the Entente. The Kingdom of Romania was neutral for the first two years of World War I, entering on the side of the Allied powers from 27 August 1916 until Central Power occupation led to the Treaty of Bucharest in May 1918, before reentering the war on 10 November 1918. Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly, and Trianonģ30,000–430,000 Romanian civilians dead from war-related causes between 19.From the operational ideas of Schlieffen they placed the emphasis on speed, flank attacks, encirclements and decisive battle. Thus, unlike the Allied armies, the German army in 1940 had an offensive doctrine that emphasised speed of decision-making, speed of manoeuvre and decentralised action. However, the modern technology was merely used to enhance the capabilities that had already been provided, thanks to the army's strategic doctrine. Innovators such as Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein recognised that the protection given by tanks increased the ability of the German army to manoeuvre in the face of enemy artillery, and that this enhanced speed and mobility. And as military technology, including that of tanks, motor vehicles, aircraft and radios, was developed during the 1920s and 30s, so it was grafted onto this doctrinal framework. This doctrine integrated the operational-level ideas taught by Schlieffen with the tactical concepts developed during World War One. Guderain recognised the importance of tanks In 1914, German units inevitably outfought their opponents whenever they encountered each other on the battlefield. Schlieffen and his successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, trained the German army well in what they termed Bewegungskrieg, or 'war of manoeuvre'. Above all else, this doctrine created aggressive and flexible leaders. Recognising that battlefield conditions changed rapidly and that orders often became overtaken by events, the German army encouraged its commanders to make decisions without waiting for orders from above, thus allowing them to take advantage of fleeting opportunities as they arose. To accomplish this, he advocated the use of the flexible command system pioneered by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder. In other words, he foresaw the need to maintain the initiative. Schlieffen also stressed the need to keep the enemy reacting to German moves. This doctrine stressed speed of manoeuvre and attacking the enemy where he was weakest, and usually this meant attacking the flanks. Schlieffen set about creating a doctrine that would allow the outnumbered German army to outfight its opponents. Always outnumbered by its enemies, it would have to match quantity with quality. Thus, in order to win, Schlieffen knew the German army would have to defeat its opponents quickly and decisively. And German strategists, most notably Alfred von Schlieffen, had concluded that Germany could not win a long, protracted war against such opposition. Schlieffen's doctrine formed the basis of 'blitzkrieg'īefore 1914-18, Germany had perceived itself as surrounded by enemies who were superior both in numbers and resources. Thus between 10 May and 21 June 1940, the Wehrmacht had accomplished what the army of Kaiser Wilhelm II had not managed to do in four years of desperate fighting in World War One. His well-trained and organised troops had also caused France's Allies, in the form of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), to beat an ignominious retreat from continental Europe. It had taken only a few short weeks for the Wehrmacht (the German army), under his control, to crush the army of the French Third Republic. He was in a good position to dictate such terms. In one of history's great ironies, Hitler insisted that the armistice be signed in the very railway car in which Germany had been compelled to admit defeat at the end of World War One. In the course of the negotiations Pétain - victor of the battle of Verdun in World War One - agreed to cede three-fifths of French territory to German control. On 21 June 1940, early in the second year of World War Two, the French president, Marshall Philippe Pétain, sued for peace with Adolf Hitler's Third Reich.
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